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Recovering misdirected trust assets in the face of Torrens 
indefeasibility 
Alvin W-L See* 
 
Where misdirected trust asset consists of, or becomes invested in, registered land, 
whether the beneficiary could recover it from the recipient is doubtful given that 
the Torrens system, through the principle of indefeasibility, effects a substantial 
reversal of the priority rules under the general law. The key to unravelling the 
seemingly inconsistent cases on this topic is to be sensitive to the diversity in 
drafting and interpretation of the different Torrens legislations, with particular 
focus on whether the principle of indefeasibility also protects registered volunteers. 
Through a comparative study of the Torrens jurisdictions in Australia and 
Singapore, this article highlights how the position differs from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction and makes suggestions on how the interests of the competing parties 
may be best balanced. 
 
 
I Introduction 
 
As many important areas of the law become increasingly regulated by statutes, the interplay 
between law and statute has become a popular research topic.1 One aspect of this is how 
equitable doctrines operate within the context of Torrens land registration.2 At the heart of the 
study of equity is the concept of trust, a defining characteristic of which is the proprietary 
character of the beneficiary’s interest. Where a trustee (T) holds a book on trust for a 
beneficiary (B), the latter acquires an equitable title in the book. If T delivers the book to a 
third-party recipient (R) in breach of the trust, B’s equitable title will bind R unless R is a bona 
fide purchaser for value without notice of the trust. Would the position be any different if the 
relevant trust asset is a Torrens registered land (Greenacre) instead? The hallmark of the 
Torrens system being the indefeasibility of registered title, would the registration of Greenacre 
in R’s name confer upon R immunity from B’s claim? 
Curiously, this simple yet important question finds no consistent answer in the existing 
case law. A number of older cases suggest that B could claim from R whereas more recent ones 
have mostly sidestepped the question, preferring instead to approach the issue as concerning 
the doctrine of knowing receipt.3 The prevailing view is that R is not liable for knowing receipt 
                                               
* Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University (SMU). An earlier version of this article was 
presented at the inaugural Asian Private Law Workshop 2018 held at SMU School of Law. I would like to thank 
the participants for their helpful comments. I am especially grateful to Lusina Ho, Natalie Skead and Man Yip for 
their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article. As usual, all errors are my own. 
1 See, eg, Elise Bant, ‘Statute and Common Law: Interaction and Influence in Light of the Principle of Coherence’ 
(2015) 38 UNSWLJ 367; J D Heydon, ‘Equity and Statute’ in P G Turner (ed), Equity and Administration (CUP 
2016) 211.  
2 See Lyria Bennett Moses and Brendan Edgeworth, ‘Taking it Personally: Ebb and Flow in the Torrens System’s 
In Personam Exception to Indefeasibility’ (2013) 35 Syd LR 107, 109–11.  
3 This is also the manner in which most academic literature have addressed the issue: see, eg, Brendan Edgeworth, 
Butt’s Land Law (7th edn, Lawbook 2017) 879–80; Brendan Edgeworth and others, Sackville & Neave: Australian 
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even if R acquired Greenacre with knowledge of T’s breach of trust, as such a claim will be 
inconsistent with the principle of indefeasibility. The need to argue on the basis of knowing 
receipt suggests that an equitable ownership claim based on B’s equitable title, which would 
have been more straightforward, would also fail for the same reason. That the question has to 
be answered indirectly by way of inference is somewhat surprising not only because Australia 
is the birthplace of the Torrens system but also in light of the special place of equitable 
doctrines in Australian jurisprudence.4 But, more importantly, does that inference accurately 
reflect the law? Does it understate the strength of B’s equitable title and overstate R’s registered 
title?  
The dilemma of whether B should be allowed to recover Greenacre from R arises from 
the fact that the Torrens system, through the principle of indefeasibility, effects a substantial 
reversal of the priority rules under the general law. Under the Torrens system, emphasis is 
placed on title by registration, and the principle of indefeasibility confers on a registered owner 
significant immunity from adverse title claims. While it is true that Torrens indefeasibility is 
not absolute, as clearly evidenced by the express exceptions in the Torrens statutes, the fact 
that fraud is the principal exception suggests that the threshold for defeating a registered title 
is set very high. The challenge is to identify a solution to B’s predicament which does not 
directly undermine this threshold. In this article, two methods of allowing B’s claim against R 
are explored: first, by implying an independent trust exception; and second, by subsuming a 
(partial) trust exception within a volunteer exception. The first method, it is argued, would 
result in inconsistent treatments of the different kinds of equitable interests and offend key 
statutory provisions that uphold the principle of indefeasibility. These difficulties can be 
avoided if the said statutory provisions are purposively interpreted so as to apply only to 
purchasers, thus lending support to the second method, which is preferred in this article. The 
central argument of this article is that a volunteer exception to the principle of indefeasibility 
should be recognised, and this would serve as a springboard for allowing B’s claim against R 
in the appropriate situations.    
While the question of whether a volunteer exception should be recognised has 
generated a great deal of debate, the impact of that debate on B’s claim against R, although 
seemingly obvious, has not received the same degree of attention by the courts and in the 
academic literature. This article draws attention to the connection between the two issues in 
the attempt to identify the place of equitable ownership claims within the Torrens framework. 
In fleshing out the details of the preferred method, particularly how the competing interests of 
B and R are best balanced, this article draws on the experience of Singapore law. The Torrens 
legislation in Singapore, although modelled after the New South Wales legislation, has unique 
features of its own. Notably, while retaining most of the indefeasibility provisions found in its 
                                               
Property Law (10th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2016) 501–02; Anthony P Moore, Scott Grattan and Lynden 
Griggs, Bradbook, MacCallum and Moore’s Australian Real Property Law (6th edn, Lawbook 2016) 261–63.  
4 Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 10, (2003) 56 NSWLR 298 [15] (Spigelman CJ). See also J D 
Heydon, M J Leeming and P G Turner, Meagher, Gummow & Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines & Remedies (5th edn, 
LexisNexis Butterworths 2014); Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Equity’s Australian Isolationism’ (2008) 8 QUTLJJ 444; 
Paul Finn, ‘Common Law Divergences’ (2013) 37 MULR 509, 515–18; Paul Finn, ‘Unity, Then Divergence: The 
Privy Council, the Common Law of England and the Common Laws of Canada, Australia and New Zealand’ in 
Andrew Robertson and Michael Tilbury (eds), The Common Law of Obligations: Divergence and Unity (Hart 
Publishing 2016) 37.  
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Australian counterparts, it also explicitly sets out exceptions relating to trusts and volunteers. 
The discussion will focus on how the seemingly inconsistent provisions can be reconciled and 
how a narrower version of the volunteer exception may be crafted to better preserve certain 
features of Torrens indefeasibility. Such a comparative study also serves to highlight 
differences between the many Torrens systems despite their common origin. Since the 
volunteer exception is not recognised in every Torrens jurisdiction, it would be a mistake to 
make any pronouncement on the prospect of B’s claim against R without considering the 
specific Torrens legislation that applies to Greenacre. 
 
II Recovering misapplied trust assets under the general law 
 
Outside the Torrens context, under the general law, B is allowed to follow Greenacre into the 
hands of R except where the latter is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of B’s 
interest. Where B’s claim succeeds, R is sometimes described as a constructive trustee or as 
holding the asset on a constructive trust.5 On one view, the trust is entirely new. B acquires a 
new equitable title under the constructive trust. The more widely accepted view, however, is 
that B could recover Greenacre from R because B’s equitable title under the original trust6 runs 
with and binds the legal title of the land.7 Since B is essentially saying that he is all along the 
true owner of Greenacre,8 the claim may be conveniently referred to as an equitable ownership 
claim, which is governed by ‘the principles of equitable title’.9  
The view that equitable title persists to bind the legal title of R finds support in the 
judgments of Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Millett in Foskett v McKeown.10 In that case, 
the claimants entrusted money to one Murphy for the purchase of real property. Murphy used 
some of the trust money to pay two annual premiums on a life insurance policy for the benefit 
of his children. Later, he committed suicide and a death benefit of £1 million was paid out by 
                                               
5 Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 195, [2012] 3 All ER 210 [80]. 
See also John McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) 785; Charles Harpum, ‘The 
Stranger as Constructive Trustee: Part 1’ (1986) 102 LQR 114. See generally Michael Bryan, ‘Recipient Liability 
under the Torrens System: Some Category Errors’ in Charles Rickett and Ross Grantham (eds), Structure and 
Justification in Private Law: Essays for Peter Birks (Hart Publishing 2008) 339, 344–45; Lionel Smith, 
‘Transfers’ in Peter Birks and Arianna Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart Publishing 2002) 111. 
6 The trust is usually express, but can also be resulting or constructive. 
7 J D Heydon and M J Leeming, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (8th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2016) 570; 
Jamie Glister and James Lee, Hanbury & Martin: Modern Equity (21st edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) 729 (‘the 
beneficiary’s equitable interest still encumbers the property’); Lynton Tucker, Nicholas Le Poidevin and James 
Brightwell, Lewin on Trusts (19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 1973 (‘continuing beneficial interests in trust 
assets’); J E Penner, The Law of Trusts (10th edn, OUP 2016) 38 (‘the beneficiaries’ interest ‘runs’ with the trust 
property’); David Hayton, Paul Matthews and Charles Mitchell, Underhill and Hayton Law of Trusts and Trustees 
(19th edn, LexisNexis 2016) 1314 (‘the beneficiaries’ subsisting equitable interests in the property’); Charles 
Mitchell and Stephen Watterson, ‘Remedies for Knowing Receipt’ in Charles Mitchell (ed), Constructive and 
Resulting Trusts (Hart Publishing 2010) 115, 115–18; Smith (n 5). 
8 On the nature of the beneficiary’s interest, see R C Nolan, ‘Equitable property’ (2006) 122 LQR 232; Ben 
McFarlane and Robert Stevens, ‘The nature of equitable property’ (2010) 4 J Eq 1; Peter Jaffey, ‘Explaining the 
Trust’ (2015) 131 LQR 377; Jessica Hudson, ‘Equitable ownership and restitution of misapplied trust property’ 
(2017) 11 J Eq 245. 
9 Bryan (n 5) 341. See also Fistar v Riverwood Legion and Community Club Ltd [2016] NSWCA 81, (2016) 91 
NSWLR 732 [46] (referring to ‘proprietary claims in equity based on a better equitable title’).  
10 [2001] 1 AC 102 (HL). 
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the insurance company. The claimants brought an equitable ownership claim to trace the trust 
money through the premiums into death benefit. In allowing the claim, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson said:  
 
This case does not involve any question of resulting or constructive trusts. The only trusts at issue are 
the express trusts of the purchasers trust deed. Under those express trusts the purchasers were entitled to 
equitable interests in the original moneys paid ... by the purchasers. Like any other equitable proprietary 
interest, those equitable proprietary interests under the purchasers trust deed which originally existed in 
the moneys ... now exist in any other property which, in law, now represents the original trust assets.11  
 
Similarly, Lord Millett said ‘[a] beneficiary of a trust is entitled to a continuing beneficial 
interest not merely in the trust property but in its traceable proceeds’.12 On this view, the 
occasional description of R as a constructive trustee is merely to avoid the potential confusion 
that R owes the same duties as T. This is especially so where T is an express trustee with duties 
beyond holding the trust asset for B. If one insists on using the language of constructive trust, 
R may be described as a constructive trustee of an equitable title under the earlier express trust, 
whose only duty is to restore Greenacre to B upon demand.13 In reality, there is only one 
equitable title throughout. 
 From B’s perspective, the idea that equitable title persists offers important advantages 
over claiming by way of a new constructive trust. In the first place, the few authorities in 
support of the constructive trust analysis tend to require R to have knowledge that Greenacre 
has been disposed of by T in breach of trust.14 Evidential burden aside, this would also place 
B in a precarious position where R, before acquiring the requisite knowledge, passes away, 
becomes insolvent, or transfers Greenacre to somebody else. Since no prior trust existed, B’s 
claim does not gain priority over those of R’s beneficiaries, creditors or transferees. None of 
these obstacles arise if B could rely on the persistence of a pre-existing equitable title, in which 
case the constructive trust argument becomes redundant. Ironically, however, the very idea that 
equitable title persists appears to offend the principle of indefeasibility, as will be elaborated 
in the next section. 
 
III Trusts within the Torrens system 
 
The defining characteristic of the Torrens system is the principle of indefeasibility, which 
protects a registered title from adverse claims save in exceptional circumstances. The principle 
is statutorily enshrined in what is commonly known as the ‘paramountcy’ provision. Section 
42(1) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), which is sufficiently representative of the 
equivalents in other Australian states, provides that a registered proprietor ‘shall, except in case 
                                               
11 ibid 108.  
12 ibid 127 (emphasis added). See also Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465 (CA) 522 (‘specific order for restoration of what 
in the eyes of equity never ceased to belong in equity to the estate’), affirmed in Ministry of Health v Simpson 
[1951] AC 251 (HL) (Diplock’s Case). 
13 Penner (n 7) 112. See also Independent Trustee Services Ltd (n 5) [80]. 
14 See, eg, Robins v Incentive Dynamics Pty Ltd (in liq) [2003] NSWCA 71, (2003) 45 ACSR 244; Heperu Pty 
Ltd v Belle [2009] NSWCA 252, (2009) 76 NSWLR 230. See also Smith (n 5); Ben McFarlane, ‘Trusts and 
Knowledge: Lessons from Australia’ in Jamie Glister and Pauline Ridge (eds), Fault Lines in Equity (Hart 
Publishing 2012) 169. 
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of fraud, hold the [title], subject to such other estates and interests and such entries, if any, as 
are recorded in that folio, but absolutely free from all other estates and interests that are not so 
recorded’.15 In other words, a registered title cannot be defeated by claims premised on a prior 
title, whether legal or equitable.16  
 Against this background, it is easy to see why there is no straightforward answer to how 
trusts are to be accommodated within the Torrens system. In determining whether B’s equitable 
ownership claim offends the principle of indefeasibility, it is necessary to ask if B is relying on 
a prior equitable title. Suppose S transfers Greenacre to T to be held on trust for B.  As the trust 
becomes fully constituted only when title to the land is registered in T’s name, B’s equitable 
title cannot be said to have arisen prior to T’s registered title. The equitable title arises 
simultaneously with registration.17 Similarly, trusts imposed by law usually arise at the time of 
the transfer/registration. This is true for resulting trusts and most forms of constructive trusts.18 
Therefore, in so far as B’s claim against T is concerned, no meaningful distinction is to be 
made between the different types of trusts. 
 When we turn to consider B’s attempt to recover Greenacre from R, however, the nature 
an equitable ownership claim becomes important. In theory, the principle of indefeasibility is 
offended only if B is seeking to enforce a pre-existing equitable title but not if B is claiming an 
entirely new equitable title under a constructive trust. In reality, however, the issue is not so 
straightforward. As the two claims may be viewed as different means towards achieving 
(essentially) the same result, courts are understandably sceptical of rejecting one but allowing 
the other.19 It is for the same reason that the courts have viewed a proprietary claim on the basis 
of knowing receipt20 as a backdoor attempt to circumvent the principle of indefeasibility.21 
They are, in essence, oblique methods of protecting B’s equitable title.22 
Ultimately, the dilemma stems from the fact that the general law and the Torrens system 
operate on very different ideas of title security. The priority rules under the general law largely 
reflect a system of static title security. Since priority is given to an earlier owner, there is a 
                                               
15 The paramountcy provision also sets out a list of overriding interests, which is irrelevant for our present 
purposes. 
16 Kelvin F K Low, ‘The Nature of Torrens Indefeasibility: Understanding the Limits of Personal Equities’ (2009) 
33 MULR 205; Moses and Edgeworth (n 2) 117. 
17 This is equally true in a situation where the Re Rose principle ([1952] Ch 499 (CA)) applies. If S dies before 
title to the land is registered in T’s name but S has done everything that can be expected of him/her to transfer 
title to T, then pending registration T would acquire an equitable title which he/she in turn holds on trust for B. 
At this point, no issue of indefeasibility of title arises as between B and T. When T is eventually registered as the 
owner of Whiteacre, the express trust becomes fully constituted and B acquires a new equitable title to Whiteacre.  
18 A constructive trust may even arise independently of, and after, registration. A simple example is the case of 
proprietary estoppel.   
19 On whether a knowing receipt claim should be recognised as falling within the category of in personam 
exceptions, see Moses and Edgeworth (n 2) 121–23; Bryan (n 5); Low, ‘The Nature of Torrens Indefeasibility’ (n 
16) 228–32; Matthew Harding, ‘Barnes v Addy Claims and the Indefeasibility of Torrens Title’ (2007) 31 MULR 
343; Tang Hang Wu, ‘Beyond the Torrens Mirror: A Framework of the In Personam Exception to Indefeasibility’ 
(2008) 32 MULR 672, 687–92;  Lyria Bennett Moses, ‘Recipient liability and Torrens Title’ (2006) 1 J Eq 135; 
Elise Bant, ‘Registration as a defence to claims in unjust enrichment: Australia and England compared’ [2011] 
Conv 309, 316–18.  
20 The knowing receipt claim and the constructive trust claim share the same requirements: McFarlane (n 14). 
21 Macquarie Bank Ltd v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 133 (CA) 157 (Tadgell JA) (Sixty-Fourth 
Throne). 
22 Low, ‘The Nature of Torrens Indefeasibility’ (n 16) 231–32. 
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strong normative justification for an equitable ownership claim with a proprietary base.23 
However, it is also precisely because of this proprietary base that the claim comes into direct 
conflict with the principle of indefeasibility, which emphasises dynamic title security. 
Allowing an equitable title to persist as it would under the general law would lead to a conflict 
with a subsequent owner’s security of receipt. The perception of conflict, however, must be 
moderated against the concession that indefeasibility is not an absolute concept. With this in 
mind, the following parts of this article attempt to reconcile the seemingly contradictory cases, 
unpack the relationship between the principle of indefeasibility and its exceptions, and examine 
possible ways in which a trust exception may be introduced. 
 
IV The assumption that equitable title does not persist  
 
In Australia, B’s claim against R has mostly been characterised as an issue of knowing receipt, 
often known as the first limb of Barnes v Addy.24 Under the general law, the claim succeeds if 
it can be shown that R receives Greenacre with knowledge of circumstances which would 
indicate a breach of trust by T.25 In the Torrens context, however, the prevailing view is that 
such a claim would fail for being inconsistent with the principle of indefeasibility. In LHK 
Nominees Pty Ltd v Kenworthy, the Western Australian Full Court said they were unaware of 
any authority ‘for the proposition that the registered interest of a purchaser of Torrens system 
land is defeasible simply because he became registered with knowledge that the transfer was 
in breach of trust’.26 This view has since been confirmed by the High Court of Australia in 
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd, albeit obiter and without in-depth 
consideration.27 The allegation of inconsistency presupposes that a successful knowing receipt 
claim would entitle B to a proprietary remedy, allowing the recovery of Greenacre from R. But 
a knowing receipt claim traditionally entitles B only to a personal remedy. Moreover, the 
personal remedy may go beyond compensating B for the monetary value of the trust asset.28 
For example, if the trust asset is income-generating, B is also entitled to recover any lost 
income. Thus, the courts have been accused of incorrectly superimposing the natural remedy 
for an equitable ownership claim onto a knowing receipt claim.29 While this is not the debate 
this article is directly concerned with, it is argued that the knowing receipt cases provide 
important clues on the availability of an equitable ownership claim as the typical set of facts 
would, under the general law, have given rise to both claims. 
                                               
23 See Elise Bant and Michael Bryan, ‘A Model of Proprietary Restitution’ in Elise Bant and Matthew Harding 
(eds), Principles of Proprietary Remedies (Lawbook 2013) 211. 
24 (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244. 
25 See, eg, Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6, (2012) 200 FCR 296 [268]–[270]; Westpac 
Banking Corporation v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2012] WASCA 157, (2012) 44 WAR 1 [2127]–[2130]. 
26 (2002) 26 WAR 517 [213] (Anderson and Steyler JJ), [185] (Murray J) (LHK Nominees); following Sixty-
Fourth Throne (n 21). 
27 [2007] HCA 22; (2007) 230 CLR 89 [193]–[196] (Farah) (appealed from the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal). 
28 Great Investments Ltd v Warner (2016) 243 FCR 516. See also Jamie Glister, ‘Accounts of Profits and Third 
Parties’ in Simone Degeling and Jason N E Varuhas (eds), Equitable Compensation and Disgorgement of Profit 
(OUP 2017) 175. 
29 See Bryan (n 5); Kelvin F K Low, ‘Of horses and carts: theories of indefeasibility and category errors in the 
Torrens system’ in Elise Bant and Matthew Harding (eds), Exploring Private Law (CUP 2010) 446. 
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In Macquarie Bank Ltd v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd the Victorian Court of Appeal 
rejected a knowing receipt claim on the basis that to hold otherwise would ‘introduce by the 
back door a means of undermining the doctrine of indefeasibility which the Torrens system 
establishes’.30 While the Court did not elaborate, the statement could be interpreted as 
presupposing the existence of a locked front door: an equitable ownership claim. Indeed, had 
an equitable ownership claim been available, it would have been entirely unnecessary for the 
case to proceed on the basis of knowing receipt especially given its more stringent 
requirements.  
Interestingly, even in spite of conflicting opinions on whether a knowing receipt claim 
should be allowed, there is a consistent assumption that an equitable ownership claim is 
unavailable. This is best illustrated by the case of Tara Shire Council v Garner where, contrary 
to the prevailing authorities, the majority in the Queensland Court of Appeal was receptive to 
the idea that a knowing receipt claim can be accommodated within the Torrens system.31 The 
Garners were the registered proprietors of a piece of land on which stood a hotel and a water 
bore. The Council offered to buy, and the Garners agreed to sell, that part of the land on which 
the water bore was located. The Council paid the purchase price but before the conveyance 
occurred the Garners sold the entire piece of land to Arcape. The Council argued that the 
Garners held the disputed part of the land on a bare trust for the Council.32 However, the attempt 
to recover that parcel of land from Arcape was argued on the basis of knowing receipt instead. 
In granting the Council leave to appeal against the interlocutory decision of the District Court, 
the Court of Appeal held that there was an arguable case for allowing the knowing receipt 
claim. This was impliedly rejected by the High Court in Farah. For our present purpose, 
however, it is only important to observe that the Court of Appeal was completely silent about 
the possibility of a more direct equitable ownership claim, which would have made it 
completely unnecessary to decide on the difficult issue of knowing receipt. This might be due 
to how the Council had pleaded its case but even so, it reflects a shared assumption that an 
equitable ownership claim is not allowed or that its existence is subject to serious doubts. 
While indeed there are older cases supporting the contrary view that B’s equitable 
ownership claim could succeed,33 these were mostly outshadowed (but not explicitly overruled) 
by the more recent ones on knowing receipt, especially after Farah. However, as the latter 
group of cases did not directly address the question of equitable ownership claim, one could 
perhaps say that the matter remains an unsettled one. Moving forward, it is important to 
determine whether the two isolated strands of authorities are truly contradictory or are 
reconcilable in some way. As shall be observed, the more recent cases all concerned claims 
against registered purchasers, who obviously attract the protection of the principle of 
indefeasibility to the fullest extent. The holdings on these cases can perhaps be confined to 
their specific facts. Even so, the case for treating registered volunteers differently, while finding 
support in some of the older cases, has to be carefully established. This would require, through 
                                               
30 Sixty-Fourth Throne (n 21) 157 (Tadgell JA). 
31 [2002] QCA 232, [2003] 1 Qd R 556 (McMurdo P and Atkinson J; Davies JA dissenting) (Tara); noted in 
Lynden Griggs, ‘The Tectonic Plate of Equity — establishing a fault line in our Torrens landscape’ (2003) 10 
APLJ 78. 
32 Presumably a vendor–purchaser constructive trust. 
33 Rasmussen v Rasmussen [1995] 1 VR 613 (SC); Hagan v Waterhouse (1991) 34 NSWLR 308 (SC). 
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the process of statutory interpretation, the identification of both the meaning and scope of 
Torrens indefeasibility. The latter depends on the degree of divergence that the Torrens system 
is prepared to tolerate, which is by no means a straightforward inquiry owing to vague and 
seemingly inconsistent statutory provisions compounded by the absence of clear legislative 
intent. As will be argued, however, it is possible to interpret a key indefeasibility provision, 
which appears on its face to preclude B’s claim against R, to apply only where R is a purchaser, 
thus providing support to the volunteer–purchaser distinction.   
 
V An independent trust exception?  
 
The Real Property Act 1886 (SA) of South Australia is exceptional for being the only one 
among the Australian Torrens statutes to set out a trust exception. Section 71(f) provides that 
indefeasibility of title does not affect ‘the rights of a cestui que trust where the registered 
proprietor is a trustee, whether the trust shall be express, implied, or constructive’. Despite its 
broad wording, however, it has been suggested that this merely allows the enforcement of a 
trust obligation which is created or assumed by the registered proprietor.34 But the reference to 
implied and constructive trusts suggests that the section is intended to apply to a wider range 
of situations. Obvious examples include constructive trusts imposed in response to the 
landowner’s unconscionable conduct and even resulting trusts, which may arise independently 
of the landowner’s conduct. In any case, allowing such claims, which are simply variations of 
a claim by B against T, does not point to the recognition of a true trust exception. As these are 
not claims based on prior title, they are never in conflict with the principle of indefeasibility to 
begin with. B’s claim against T should be allowed even in the absence of a statutory 
exception.35  
 The litmus test of a true trust exception is in allowing B to claim from R, whether by a 
broad reading of section 71(f) or, in the case of other Torrens statutes, by implying a true trust 
exception. This solution is not inconceivable considering that the principle of indefeasibility 
was never intended to be absolute. Even as originally conceived, the principle of indefeasibility 
was subject to a fraud exception.36 There are, however, at least two objections to introducing 
an independent trust exception, both drawing on the slippery slope argument.  
 First, on consistency, it would be difficult to see why such special treatment is not also 
afforded to other kinds of equitable interests such as equitable leases and mortgages.37 Like an 
equitable title, both equitable leases and mortgages can be understood as property rights carved 
out of the legal (registered) title.  
 Second, recognising a true trust exception would disturb the conventionally high 
threshold for departing from the principle of indefeasibility. Fraud is often the sole (or main) 
express exception whereas, except for the Real Property Act 1886 (SA), no trust exception is 
expressly provided for.38 The prominent role of the fraud exception is most apparent in what is 
                                               
34 Brian Hunter, ‘Equity and the Torrens System’ (1964) 2 Adel L Rev 208, 210–11.  
35 See, eg, Bahr v Nicholay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604 (HC) 618–19 (Mason CJ and Dawson J). 
36 Real Property Act 1858 (SA), s 33.  
37 Edgeworth, Butt’s Land Law (n 3) 879–80. 
38 While the relevant legislations in Queensland and Northern Territory additionally state that a registered title 
may be defeated by ‘an equity arising from the act of the registered proprietor’ (Land Title Act 2000 (NT), s 
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commonly known as the ‘notice’ provision, which complements the paramountcy provision. 
Since Farah was an appeal from New South Wales, it would be useful to refer again to the 
Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), which sets out a notice provision in section 43: 
 
Except in the case of fraud no person contracting or dealing with or taking or proposing to take a transfer 
from the registered proprietor of any registered estate or interest … shall be affected by notice direct or 
constructive of any trust or unregistered interest, any rule of law or equity to the contrary 
notwithstanding; and the knowledge that any such trust or unregistered interest is in existence shall not 
of itself be imputed as fraud.39 
 
The purpose of the notice provision is clearly to abolish equitable fraud, which is founded on 
actual or constructive notice of a prior equitable interest.40 Thus, mere receipt of trust property 
by R, even with notice of the trust, does not constitute fraud. The High Court in Farah went 
even further to suggest that even if R was aware of T’s breach of trust, it would constitute fraud 
only if T’s breach amounts to fraud.41 Thus, if T’s breach of trust is due to mere carelessness 
or mistake, R’s knowledge of that breach does not constitute fraud.  
Applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius in interpreting the 
paramountcy and notice provisions, and taking into account how fraud is strictly defined, the 
picture that emerges appears to be that courts ought to be slow in implying exceptions involving 
a lesser degree of culpability than fraud.42 In other words, B has no recourse against R unless 
the latter’s conduct amounts to fraud. To allow otherwise would upset the high threshold for 
defeating a registered title set by the fraud exception. 
 
VI Limiting the scope of Torrens indefeasibility  
 
An alternative method to introducing a trust exception is by narrowing the scope of the notice 
provision by way of purposive interpretation. Apart from abolishing equitable fraud, the notice 
provision has been understood to have the effect of abolishing the doctrine of notice in 
general.43 But it is important to identify the role of notice under the general law, particularly in 
relation to the persistence of equitable title. As B’s equitable title binds R even if the latter has 
no notice of the trust, it would be inaccurate, as a general statement, to say that because the 
                                               
189(1)(a)), this ‘personal equity’ exception is arguably not invoked where all that R did was to receive Whiteacre 
by registration (Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), s 185(1)(a)). Absent some unconscionable conduct by R, there is no 
recognised cause of action under which B could claim from R. For the view that a knowing receipt claim falls 
within this exception, see Tara (n 31). 
39 See also Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT), s 59; Land Title Act 2000 (NT), s 188(2)(a); Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), 
s 184(2)(a); Real Property Act 1886 (SA), ss 72, 186–87; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas), s 41; Transfer of Land Act 
1958 (Vic), s 43; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA), s 134.  
40 Waimiha Sawmilling Co Ltd v Waione Timber Co Ltd [1926] AC 101 (PC). See also Peter Butt, ‘Notice and 
Fraud in the Torrens System: A Comparative Analysis’ (1978) 13 UWAL Rev 354.  
41 Farah (n 27) [192]. See also LHK Nominees (n 26) [185] (Murray J). For criticism, see Rob Chambers, 
‘Knowing receipt: Frozen in Australia’ (2007) 2 J Eq 40, 51–52. 
42 See, eg, United Overseas Bank Ltd v Bebe bte Mohammad [2006] SGCA 30, [2006] 4 SLR 884 (Bebe): ‘[T]he 
inclusion of the exception of fraud to which the registered proprietor or his agent is a party would, by implication, 
also exclude from such exception all conduct which in law or equity has a lesser degree of moral turpitude than 
actual fraud’: at [91]. 
43 Harding (n 19) 356. 
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doctrine of notice is abolished, B is completely barred from recovering Greenacre from R.44 A 
clearer picture emerges if we consider the relevance of notice from R’s perspective, ie, as a 
defence.45 As Professor Michael Bryan explains:  
 
The doctrine of notice, which is the primary though not the only determinant of recovery of equitable 
property, was developed over 500 years ago in order to identify the circumstances in which beneficial 
interests under a trust will be destroyed by the trustee’s unauthorised conveyance of the trust property to 
a third party. It only assumed its final form after several centuries of Chancery litigation involving 
various categories of recipients of trust property – heirs and creditors, as well as purchasers with notice 
of the breach and donees.46  
 
Today the doctrine of notice is best recognised as an element of the defence of bona fide 
purchase.47 If R is a bona fide purchaser having no notice of the trust, he takes free of B’s 
equitable title. Against this background, Professor Peter Butt rightly asked: ‘What possible 
purpose can the [notice] provision have, if not to protect a purchaser with notice against the 
consequence of his notice?’48 Unsurprisingly, the case of Mills v Stokman,49 which has been 
cited as ‘a striking illustration of the effect of the abolition of the doctrine of notice’,50 was in 
fact concerned with a purchaser having notice of a prior interest. The effect of abolishing the 
doctrine of notice, therefore, is to remove a hurdle to R’s pleading of the bona fide purchase 
defence. In other words, the defence of bona fide purchase is given enhanced scope under the 
Torrens system: a purchaser for value, whether or not having notice of the trust, is protected 
by the principle of indefeasibility and hence takes free of any pre-existing equitable title. On 
the flip side, since notice has always been irrelevant to an equitable ownership claim against a 
volunteer, the abolition of the doctrine of notice, it may be argued, does not affect the applicable 
general law. The notice provision reinforces the paramountcy provision only in so far as it 
relates to a registered purchaser.  
 A contrary view is that the notice provision prevents absolutely the persistence of 
equitable title, protecting any ‘registered proprietor’51 or ‘third party’.52 Although the heading 
of section 43 of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) reads ‘Purchaser from registered proprietor 
not to be affected by notice’,53 the section also refers to a person taking a ‘transfer’. Section 3 
                                               
44 cf ibid 357, who refers to equitable ownership claims as ‘proprietary claims based on notice’. 
45 See Pilcher v Rawlins (1872) LR 7 Ch App 259. 
46 Bryan (n 5) 348. 
47 It was in this context that the doctrine was originally developed: see David Fox, ‘Purchase for Value Without 
Notice’ in Paul S Davies, Simon Douglas and James Goudkamp (eds), Defences in Equity (Hart Publishing 2018) 
53. See also Heydon, Leeming and Turner (n 4) 352–60; McGhee (n 5) 63–74; Kevin Gray and Susan Francis 
Gray, Elements of Land Law (5th edn, OUP 2009) 1150–56; Charles Harpum, Stuart Bridge and Martin Dixon, 
Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 259–71. 
48 Butt, ‘Notice and Fraud in the Torrens System’ (n 40) 375; Heydon, Leeming and Turner (n 4) 359; Bernard 
O’Brien, ‘Understanding Indefeasibility under the Victorian Transfer of Land Act’ (1980) 12 MULR 390, 398–
401. cf Peter Radan, ‘Volunteers and Indefeasibility’ (1999) 7 APLJ 197. 
49 (1967) 116 CLR 61 (HC). 
50 Harding (n 19) 356 n 80. 
51 ibid. 
52 Low, ‘The Nature of Torrens Indefeasibility’ (n 16) 217. 
53 See Real Property Act 1860 (SA), s 118. See also Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT), s 59; Real Property Act 1886 
(SA), s 186; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas), s 41; Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), s 43; Transfer of Land Act 1893 
(WA), s 134. 
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defines ‘transfer’ to mean ‘the passing of any estate or interest in land under this Act, whether 
for valuable consideration or otherwise’.54 Both sections were borrowed from the Real Property 
Act 1860 (SA), where they first appeared. There the position seems even clearer as the shoulder 
note to the notice provision reads ‘Transferee not affected by notice’.55  
Even so, the relevant parliamentary debate suggests that this was inconclusive,56 
especially following the introduction of other provisions that specifically refer to ‘a transferee 
bona fide for valuable consideration’.57 More importantly, a literal reading of the notice 
provision would obscure the relationship between the doctrine of notice (which the notice 
provision seeks to abolish) and the defence of bona fide purchase (which can be invoked only 
by a true purchaser). In the same vein, since an equitable ownership claim against a volunteer 
does not depend on notice, it would be odd to suggest that the notice provision is intended to 
cover such a situation. As the doctrine of notice was never relevant to volunteers to begin with, 
there is no meaningful sense in saying that it was abolished by the notice provision.  
A purposive interpretation, on the other hand, accords with the idea of traditionality of 
statutes,58 which posits that statutes do not introduce new concepts in the abstract but does so 
by reference to previous laws.59 The specific purpose of the notice provision is to strengthen 
the position of registered purchasers, from which we may further infer that volunteers are to be 
excluded from the benefit of title indefeasibility. If R is a volunteer, then, applying the general 
law, B is entitled to recover Greenacre from R regardless of notice.  
On this preferred view, the trust exception is subsumed within a volunteer exception, 
and this fits neatly within a Torrens system that emphasises the protection of registered 
purchasers. Importantly, the trust exception will not be a full-fledged version in that it does not 
apply to purchasers. In contrast, an independent trust exception will subject even purchasers to 
the usual rules: bona fide purchasers will be bound only if they had no notice of the trust. Given 
the objections to implying an independent trust exception, the best case for B’s attempt to claim 
from R is to first argue the existence of a volunteer exception.  
 
VII Trust and volunteer exceptions intertwined  
 
In his detailed analysis of Torrens indefeasibility, Professor W N Harrison suggested:  
 
                                               
54 One might also argue that it is used in the old common law sense to mean a person who receives the legal title 
by grant (as opposed to operation of law) such that it includes a volunteer: see Powell v Cleland [1948] 1 KB 262, 
272. See also Gray and Gray (n 47) 1152; Harpum, Bridge and Dixon (n 47) 47, 260. 
55 Real Property Act 1860 (SA), s 104. See also Land Title Act 2000 (NT), s 188(2)(a) (‘quality of registered 
interests’); Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), s 184(2)(a); Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), s 43 (‘Persons dealing with 
registered proprietor not affected by notice’). Interestingly, the heading of the notice provision in the Real Property 
Act 1886 (SA), which superseded the Real Property Act 1860 (SA), now refers to ‘purchasers’ instead of 
‘transferees’ (s 186). 
56 See Rosalind F Atherton, ‘Donees, Devisees and Torrens Title: The Problem of the Volunteer under the Real 
Property Acts’ (1998) 4 Aust J Leg Hist 121, 150–56. 
57 See, eg, Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT), s 152; Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), s 118; Real Property Act 1886 
(SA), ss 67, 71; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas), s 149; Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), s 69; Transfer of Land Act 
1893 (WA), s 199. See also Peter Butt, ‘Volunteers and indefeasibility’ (1996) 70 ALJ 285, 285–86; Robert 
Chambers, An Introduction to Property Law in Australia (3rd edn, Lawbook 2013) 571–72.  
58 See Martin Krygier, ‘The Traditionality of Statutes’ (1988) 1 Ratio Juris 20. 
59 Moses and Edgeworth (n 2) 110. 
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(a) A voluntary transferee is bound by all equities enforceable against the transferor. 
(b) A purchaser for value is not bound by an equity enforceable against the transferor, 
whether he had notice of it or not, unless his conduct in securing a transfer involved 
actual fraud against the holder of the equity.60 
 
This assumes that volunteers are excluded from the protection of Torrens indefeasibility. But 
the truth is that the issue is far from settled. With the exception of Queensland and Northern 
Territory,61 the Torrens statutes in other states do not clearly distinguish between purchasers 
and volunteers in so far as the principle of indefeasibility is concerned. The issue is left to 
statutory interpretation, which is by no means straightforward as the earlier discussion on the 
notice provision illustrates.62 While what is the ‘correct’ position is certainty open to debate, 
the point is simply that, in answering whether B should be allowed to claim from R, one cannot 
ignore the divergence between the different Torrens jurisdictions on the treatment of registered 
volunteers. 
While parts of the High Court’s judgment in Farah seemed to have touched on this 
issue, it certainly wasn’t clear enough to lay the debate to rest. On the one hand, the Court 
explained that a tracing claim would have failed against the defendants who received trust 
property because they were purchasers.63 This suggests that the status of the defendants as 
purchasers was significant in attracting the protection of indefeasibility. On the other hand, 
further down the judgment, the Court said cursorily that the claim would fail against the 
defendants ‘even if they are volunteers’.64 But no reasons were given, and no authorities were 
cited, for this proposition. In any case, since the defendants were purchasers, the proposition 
was strictly obiter and has been given little weight in the debate.65 In his analysis of Farah, 
Professor Bryan came to the conclusion that the plaintiff’s attempt to recover the land was 
rightly denied, for even if the claim were characterised as an equitable ownership claim (instead 
of a knowing receipt claim) it would have been barred by the principle of indefeasibility.66 
However, despite the apparent generality of his comment, his regular references to the bona 
fide purchase defence throughout his chapter suggests that he meant only to comment on the 
specific facts of Farah.  
Curiously, the High Court did not specifically turn its mind to the position in New South 
Wales despite the origin of the appeal and the existence of authoritative support for extending 
the protection of indefeasibility to registered volunteers. The main authority is Bogdanovic v 
                                               
60 W N Harrison, ‘Indefeasibility of Torrens Title’ (1954) 2 UQLJ 206, 244. 
61 Where the principle of indefeasibility applies to purchasers and volunteers alike: Land Title Act 2000 (NT), s 
183; Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), s 180. 
62 For the view that legislative intent is inconclusive, see Rosalind F Croucher, ‘Inspired law reform or quick fix? 
or, “well, Mr Torrens what so you reckon now?”: a reflection on voluntary transactions and forgeries in the 
Torrens system’ (2009) 30 Adel L Rev 291; Atherton (n 56). 
63 Farah (n 27) [187]–[189]. 
64 ibid [198]. 
65 See Edgeworth, Butt’s Land Law (n 3) 845; Edgeworth and others (n 3) 470; Moore, Grattan and Griggs (n 3) 
250; Lynden Griggs, ‘In personam: Barnes v Addy and the High Court’s deliberations in Farah Constructions Pty 
Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd’ (2008) 15 APLJ 268, 274. cf Bant, ‘Statute and Common Law’ (n 1) 375. 
66 Bryan (n 5) 356. 
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Koteff,67 which was not considered by the High Court in Farah.68 Interestingly, when the matter 
was revisited in Arambasic v Veza (No 4), Sackville AJA did not cite Farah but instead 
regarded himself to be bound by Bogdanovic.69 Having said this, in so far as New South Wales 
is concerned, the rejection of the volunteer exception is consistent with the assumption in 
Farah that an equitable ownership claim should be denied. Against this established trend, 
Kearney J’s suggestion in Hagan v Waterhouse that an equitable owner could recover 
misappropriated trust asset from an innocent volunteer by ‘a direct claim’70 can no longer be 
regarded as good law.71 
Since Farah has limited influence on this topic, and is unlikely to have the effect of 
unifying the divergent positions across the different states, it would be useful to investigate the 
connection between the treatment of registered volunteers and the persistence of equitable title 
in the other states. In Western Australia, the assumption in LHK Nominees72 that equitable title 
does not persist is consistent with the rejection of a volunteer exception in a number of other 
cases.73 Similarly, in Queensland, where the benefits of registration apply ‘whether or not 
valuable consideration has been given’,74 it must have been right for the Court in Tara75 to 
assume that an equitable ownership claim is unavailable.76 In the absence of a trust exception, 
even a partial one, equitable titles are to be protected primarily by the system of caveats.77 Had 
B been prompt in lodging a caveat over Greenacre, T would have been prevented from 
transferring the registered title to R, and the question of persistence of B’s equitable title does 
not even arise.  
In contrast, the solution proposed in this article finds support in jurisdictions where a 
volunteer exception is recognised. In Victoria, for example, the Supreme Court in King v Smail 
held that since volunteers acquire no protection from the notice provision, then ‘by parity of 
reasoning they should be held to fall outside the indefeasibility provisions’.78 The later case of 
Sixty-Fourth Throne, which denied a proprietary claim for knowing receipt on the assumption 
                                               
67 (1988) 12 NSWLR 472 (CA). Followed in Arambasic v Veza (No 4) [2014] NSWSC 1109, (2014) 17 BPR 
33,101 [164]; Penrith RSL Club Ltd v Cameron [2001] NSWSC 413, (2001) 10 BPR 18,621 [23]. 
68 However, Bogdanovic (n 67) was cited in the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal: Say-Dee Pty 
Ltd v Farah Constructions Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 309 [238].  
69 Arambasic (n 67) [164]. Instead, Farah (n 27) was cited for an unrelated proposition (at [162]). 
70 Hagan (n 33) 369–70. Bogdanovic (n 67) was not cited. 
71 However, a limited volunteer exception is provided for in the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), s 118(1)(d)(ii) 
(ejectment provision). Suppose T transfers Whiteacre to R1, who in turn transfers it to R2. If R1 is fraudulent in 
acquiring the title, then a claim to recover Whiteacre can be brought against R2 if he is not a bona fide purchaser 
for valuable consideration. See Cassegrain v Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 2, (2015) 254 CLR 
425; noted in Penny Carruthers and Natalie Skead, ‘Confirming Torrens orthodoxy: The High Court decision in 
Cassegrain v Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd’ (2015) 24 APLJ 211. 
72 LHK Nominees (n 26). 
73 Conlan v Registrar of Titles [2001] WASC 201, (2001) 24 WAR 299; Gadsdon v Gadsdon [2003] WASC 48. 
74 Land Title Act (Qld), s 180. 
75 Tara (n 31). 
76 The position should be the same in the Northern Territory: Land Title Act 2000 (NT), s 183. 
77 This appeared to be original intent of Sir Robert Torrens: see Robert R Torrens, A Handy Book on the Real 
Property Act of South Australia, Containing a Succinct Account of That Measure, Compiled from Authentic 
Documents, with Full Information and Examples for the Guidance of Persons Dealing; also, an Index to the Act 
(Advertiser and Chronicle Offices 1862) 9. See also Mary-Anne Hughson, Marcia Neave and Pamela O’Connor, 
‘Reflections on the Mirror of Title: Resolving the Conflict between Purchasers and Prior Interest Holders’ (1997) 
21 MULR 460, 462. 
78 [1958] VR 273 (SC) 277 (Adam J). 
For published version, see Alvin W-L See, “Recovering misdirected trust assets in 
the face of Torrens indefeasibility” (2019) 13 Journal of Equity 1  
 14 
that equitable title does not persist, can be distinguished on the ground that it concerned a bona 
fide purchaser for value.79 That this distinction is rightly drawn finds support in the earlier case 
of Rasmussen v Rasmussen.80 The plaintiff was the beneficiary of a block of land under a 
common intention constructive trust. When the constructive trustee died, the block of land 
became registered in the defendant’s name under the former’s will. Applying King, Coldrey J 
held that the plaintiff could recover the block of land from the defendant as the latter was a 
volunteer. Despite perfectly illustrating the approach suggested in this article,81 it is unfortunate 
that the case, often appearing only in footnotes,82 has not been accorded the attention it 
deserves.83 The position ought to be the same in South Australia where the volunteer exception 
is also recognised.84 Applying the approach suggested in this article, section 71(f) of the Real 
Property Act 1886 (SA) can be more broadly construed to allow the persistence of equitable 
title where the recipient is a volunteer. An overly cautious reading of the section, as suggested 
by some scholars, does not sufficiently account for the implication of the volunteer exception 
on the beneficiary’s claim.85 If this analysis is correct, then in these jurisdictions, B’s attempt 
to recover the misdirected trust asset from a volunteer R can be achieved without having to 
argue knowing receipt, which is more difficult to establish than simply claiming on the strength 
of B’s equitable title. 
By comparing the two isolated groups of cases — one concerning the volunteer 
exception and the other concerning knowing receipt — based on where Greenacre is registered, 
the picture that emerges is one of consistency between the assumption that equitable title 
persists and the recognition of a volunteer exception. However, as the two groups of cases do 
not refer to each other, the degree of consistency might be purely coincidental. Nonetheless, 
by highlighting the correlation, it is hoped that the relationship between the two groups of cases 
will receive more attention in both case law and academic literature. 
Although this article takes the view that the notice provision impliedly recognises a 
volunteer exception, and that the notice provisions in the different states ought to be 
consistently interpreted due to their common origin, the reality of the matter is that too much 
water has flowed under the bridge to insist on a uniform approach.86 This is particularly so in 
jurisdictions where the legislature has intervened to reject a volunteer exception. Thus, instead 
of insisting on any correct answer, the more realistic approach would be to embrace the 
divergence and stress only the need for consistency in answering the questions of whether a 
volunteer acquires indefeasible title and whether equitable title persists. Such consistency is 
clearly observed in several states with the exception of New South Wales, where the ambiguity 
can be attributed to the failure of the High Court to provide a reasoned pronouncement on this 
                                               
79 Sixty-Fourth Throne (n 21). 
80 Rasmussen (n 33). 
81 See also O’Brien (n 48) 398–401.  
82 See Edgeworth, Butt’s Land Law (n 3) 844; Moore, Grattan and Griggs (n 3) 249; Chambers, An Introduction 
to Property Law in Australia (n 57) 570; M W Bryan, V J Vann and S Barkehall Thomas, Equity & Trusts in 
Australia (2nd edn, CUP 2017) 350. The case was not even cited in Heydon, Leeming and Turner (n 4); Heydon 
and Leeming (n 7).  
83 While a more detailed summary of the case was set out in Edgeworth and others (n 3) 467–69, its significance 
on the question of persistence of equitable title was not specifically stressed.  
84 Biggs v McEllister (1880) 14 SALR 86 (SC); Peck v Peck [2010] SASC 258. 
85 See, eg, Hunter (n 34) 210–11. 
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issue. But if one accepts that either position — to recognise or not to recognise a volunteer 
exception — can be justified, then in light of the divergent positions across the different states, 
it is natural to also expect the question of whether equitable title persists to generate no uniform 
answer.87 Professor Harrison’s statement is therefore as much an over-generalisation as the 
general assumption that equitable title does not persist. 
Even in jurisdictions that recognise a trust exception, the question remains as to whether 
the registered title of every volunteer is defeasible. In this regard, the Torrens system in 
Singapore adopts an interesting approach from which interesting insights might be drawn for 
the development of Australian law. 
 
VIII Baalman’s Torrens system in Singapore 
 
Almost a century after its inception, the Torrens system of land titles registration was 
introduced into Singapore in 1956.88 The Land Titles Ordinance 1956 (Singapore) was 
modelled after the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). Its drafter, John Baalman, was a barrister 
and Examiner of Titles in the Office of the Registrar General in New South Wales. He was also 
a keen writer on land law.89 Drawing on the wealth of Antipodean experience, particularly from 
New South Wales, Baalman took the opportunity to dispel uncertainties which arose from 
diverging interpretations of earlier Torrens statutes. Given Baalman’s personal opinions and 
vision of the Torrens system, which did not always align with the then prevailing judicial 
opinions, it is interesting to see how the original Australian position compares to the modified 
Singaporean position, particularly in accommodating B’s claim against R. 
The legislation in force today is the Land Titles Act 1993 (Singapore),90 which is 
materially identical to its predecessor, the Land Titles Ordinance 1956 (Singapore). The 
paramountcy provision, which is to be found in section 46(1), is worded in much the same way 
as the New South Wales equivalent.91 But an interesting feature of the Land Titles Act 1993 
(Singapore) is that a trust exception is expressly provided for. Section 46(2)(c) states that, 
notwithstanding the principle of indefeasibility, a plaintiff is allowed ‘to enforce against a 
proprietor who is a trustee the provisions of the trust’.92 Thus, while recent Singapore cases 
have expressed caution over the admissibility of in personam exceptions, in so far the 
enforcement of trust is concerned the issue turns mainly on the interpretation of section 
46(2)(c). To date, however, the only discussion relating to section 46(2)(c) has been whether it 
applies only to express trusts or extends also to trusts imposed by law.93 With respect, this is 
                                               
87 Bryan, Vann and Barkehall Thomas (n 82) 350; Moses (n 19) 143–44. 
88 Land Titles Ordinance 1956 (Singapore) (Ordinance 21 of 1956). 
89 See John Baalman, The Torrens System in New South Wales (Lawbook 1951); John Baalman, ‘Approach to the 
Torrens System’ (1956) 2 Syd LR 87. 
90 (Singapore, cap 157, 2004 rev ed) (originally No 27 of 1993). 
91 On the interpretation of the paramountcy provision, see Kelvin F K Low, ‘The Story of “Personal Equities” in 
Singapore: Thus Far and Beyond’ [2009] Sing JLS 161, 167–69. 
92 The trust exception had been included from the very beginning: Land Titles Ordinance 1956 (Singapore), s 
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to frame the issue too narrowly. Even if section 46(2)(c) is reworded to make explicit reference 
to trusts imposed by law,94 all this does is to confirm that B may enforce the trust against T 
regardless of the type of trust in issue. Such a claim, not being based on prior title, does not 
offend the principle of indefeasibility.  
Whether B may recover Greenacre from R is a separate and more difficult question. 
Interestingly, despite expressly providing for a trust exception, the Land Titles Act 1993 
(Singapore) continues to retain a notice provision in section 47, which is in pari materia with 
section 43(1) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). As suggested earlier, however, the 
apparent inconsistency can be ironed out if the notice provision is interpreted purposively such 
that its application is limited to registered purchasers. By focusing on the connection between 
the doctrine of notice, which the notice provision seeks to abolish, and the bona fide purchase 
defence, it can be deduced that the provision applies only to enhance the protection of 
registered purchasers. From this it may also be inferred that registered volunteers are not 
afforded the same degree of protection. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Baalman was 
well known for his opinion that registered volunteers do not always acquire indefeasible title 
as registered purchasers do.95 This view was codified by the inclusion in the Land Titles 
Ordinance 1956 (Singapore) of a volunteer exception to indefeasibility of registered title.96 The 
equivalent provision in the Land Titles Act 1993 (Singapore), section 46(3), reads: ‘Nothing 
in this section shall confer on a proprietor claiming otherwise than as a purchaser any better 
title than was held by his immediate predecessor’. In his commentary of the Land Titles 
Ordinance 1956 (Singapore), Baalman explained that this legal framework was premised on 
the idea that the Torrens system is ‘predominantly a purchaser’s system’ primarily aimed at 
facilitating land transactions by removing associated risks faced by purchasers.97 A volunteer 
who provides no value is not exposed to the same risks. Importantly, from its prefacing words, 
it is clear that section 46(3) does not operate to exclude registered volunteers from the full 
protection of the principle of indefeasibility. Instead, the rule is stated in negative terms to 
clarify that nothing in the Land Titles Act 1993 (Singapore), including sections 46(1) and 47, 
has the effect of extending the full protection of indefeasibility to registered volunteers. This 
presupposes that the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), after which the Land Titles Act 1993 
(Singapore) was modelled, is not on its terms sufficiently broad to confer indefeasible title on 
a registered volunteer.98 Also relevant is the definition of a purchaser in section 4(1): ‘a person 
who, in good faith and for valuable consideration, acquires an estate or interest in land’. That 
absence of notice is omitted from the definition is consistent with the notice provision in section 
47, which in turn supports the view that the latter applies only if a registered purchaser is 
concerned. 
                                               
Trust Statutory Exception to Indefeasibility in the Singapore Torrens System’ [2017] Sing JLS 151; Barry C 
Crown, ‘Back to Basics: Indefeasibility of Title under the Torrens System: United Overseas Bank Ltd v Bebe bte 
Mohammad’ [2007] Sing JLS 117, 124–26; Tang Hang Wu, ‘The Constructive Trust in Singapore: Five Persistent 
Puzzles’ (2010) 22 SAcLJ 136, 162–64. 
94 cf Real Property Act 1886 (SA), s 71(f) (discussed above). 
95 Baalman, The Torrens System in New South Wales (n 89) 149–50. 
96 Land Titles Ordinance 1956 (Singapore), s 28(3). 
97 John Baalman, The Singapore Torrens System: being a commentary on the Land Titles Ordinance 1956 of the 
State of Singapore (Lee Kim Hang 1961) 86. See also Douglas Pike, ‘Introduction of the Real Property Act in 
South Australia’ (1961) 1 Adel L Rev 169. 
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Importantly, Baalman already had a clear idea of how the volunteer exception would 
interact with the trust exception. In his commentary, he said that the trust exception may be 
invoked ‘against a proprietor who is their trustee; or against a volunteer claiming through 
him’.99 The first part of the statement refers to B’s claim against T, whereas the second part 
refers to a claim by B against R. But even if the trust exception were omitted, it is clear that 
B’s claim against a volunteer R would succeed by invoking the volunteer exception. While this 
issue has not arisen for consideration by the Singapore courts, a careful reading of the existing 
body of case law reveals consistency with Baalman’s framework.  
The facts of Ho Kon Kim v Lim Gek Kim Betsy100 are particularly helpful in illustrating 
the difference between B’s claim against T and B’s claim against R. Ho entered into an 
agreement to sell her land to Betsy for redevelopment. Under the agreement, Betsy was to pay 
Ho S$4.2 million, obtain subdivision of the land into three lots and retransfer an earmarked lot 
with a completed house to Ho.101 After the land was transferred to Betsy, it was mortgaged to 
Overseas Chinese Banking Corp (OCBC) for securing an overdraft facility to finance the 
construction work. In recognition of Ho’s interest, OCBC agreed to grant an unconditional 
discharge of the mortgage over earmarked lot upon successful subdivision of the land. The 
dispute arose when Betsy, without Ho’s knowledge, remortgaged the land to RHB Bank Bhd 
(RHB). Although RHB agreed to take the mortgage on essentially the same terms as the OCBC 
mortgage, it later sought to exercise its power of sale free of Ho’s interest when Betsy defaulted 
on repayments. The Singapore Court of Appeal accepted that, at the point the sale was 
completed, Betsy held a one-third share in the land on trust for Ho.102 The trust was enforceable 
by virtue of the trust exception in section 46(2)(c) of the Land Titles Act 1993 (Singapore).103 
Although the Court did not elaborate, this is clearly a straightforward example of a claim by B 
against T. As Ho’s equitable title arose simultaneously with the registration of Betsy as the 
new owner, Ho’s claim was not premised on the existence of a prior title which the principle 
of indefeasibility abhors. Interestingly, this was the only reference to the trust exception in the 
entire judgment. The Court rejected Ho’s claim against RHB on the ground that RHB’s 
repudiation of its promise to preserve Ho’s interest was not dishonest and hence did not 
constitute fraud.104 However, the Court held that RHB’s conduct was unconscionable and this 
gave rise to a constructive trust of the kind recognised in Bahr v Nicholay (No 2).105 This was 
justified not by invoking the trust exception but by recognising the claim as an in personam 
exception.106  
 Later, in the landmark case of United Overseas Bank Ltd v Bebe bte Mohammad, the 
Singapore Court of Appeal expressed disagreement with the finding of a constructive trust in 
Betsy,107 even going as far as to suggest that ‘the decision in Betsy would have to be 
                                               
99 Baalman, The Singapore Torrens System (n 97) 85. 
100 [2001] SGCA 62, [2001] 3 SLR(R) 220 (Betsy). 
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reconsidered for consistency with the policy of the [Land Titles Act 1993 (Singapore)]’.108 
However, the Court regarded the outcome in Betsy to be correct either because RHB’s conduct 
was fraudulent or because RHB had undertaken to hold one-third of the land on an express 
trust for Ho.109 But neither solution is particularly convincing.110 The fraud solution is doubtful 
not only because the Court in Betsy did not make a finding of dishonesty but also because it 
sidestepped the question of whether the fraud exception applies only to fraud in obtaining 
registration.111 The trust analysis is also unpersuasive as the facts did not reveal any clear 
intention on the part of RHB to create a trust for Ho and, even if there were, the formality 
requirements were not satisfied.112 But even in light of the disagreement, both decisions share 
the assumption that Ho’s equitable title under the earlier express trust (of which Betsy was the 
original trustee) did not bind RHB. Had it been otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to 
argue that RHB was fraudulent, that RHB had declared an express trust in Ho’s favour, or that 
a constructive trust arose from RHB’s unconscionable conduct.113 Although both decisions 
were silent on this point, the simple explanation is that RHB, being a registered purchaser, was 
donned with the full armour of indefeasibility. Therefore, even though the Land Titles Act 
1993 (Singapore) expressly provides for a trust exception, compliance with Baalman’s 
framework demands that it should not be invoked to allow an equitable ownership claim against 
the registered purchaser. 
In contrast, registered volunteers are not afforded the same degree of protection. In 
Mahidon Nichiar bte Mohd Ali v Dawood Sultan Kamaldin, a rare instance where section 46(3) 
of the Land Titles Act 1993 (Singapore) was invoked, the Singapore Court of Appeal held that, 
on account of the fact that the defendant was a volunteer, he was not allowed to assert 
indefeasibility of title by relying on section 46(1)114 nor to argue that that the beneficiaries’ 
claim could only succeed by proving fraud.115 The high threshold for defeating a registered 
title set by the fraud exception simply does not apply to registered volunteers. This is true even 
if the volunteer is completely without fault. However, it is important to observe that section 
46(3) does not say that the title of a volunteer is never indefeasible. Instead, applying something 
akin to the nemo dat quod non habet rule, the volunteer’s title is only as good as that of his 
predecessor in title. Assuming that R is a volunteer, the reason why B could recover Greenacre 
from R is because R’s title is only as good as T’s, and T’s title is defeasible under the trust 
exception. Suppose R then sells Greenacre to R2, a bona fide purchaser. The registration of R2 
as owner would have validating effect, which clears away the imperfection in R’s title. Thus, 
if R2 later donates Greenacre to R3, a volunteer, R3 acquires the same indefeasible title that 
R2 had. As the slate has already been wiped clean, whether R3 has notice of T’s breach of trust 
is irrelevant. This is to be contrasted with the position in South Australia where a trust exception 
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is also expressly provided for and a volunteer exception judicially recognised. Since the 
volunteer exception has been stated in unqualified terms, it is likely that the only relevant 
question is whether R3 is a volunteer. If R3 is a volunteer, his or her title is defeasible by B.  
Under this model, the fact that R2 is a bona fide purchaser does not have the effect of wiping 
the slate clean for R3.116 
This conveniently leads to us to the question of how Baalman’s Torrens system departs 
from the priority rules under the general law. We have seen that while an equitable ownership 
claim will surely fail if the recipient is a registered purchaser, it does not follow that the claim 
will succeed against every registered volunteer. A registered volunteer who acquires title from 
a registered purchaser similarly obtains the indefeasible title. In contrast, under the general law, 
a volunteer R is automatically bound by B’s equitable title since the bona fide purchase defence 
does not apply. Thus, Baalman’s Torrens system goes further than the general law in protecting 
the volunteer’s security of receipt. Turning to the position of purchasers, it has been explained 
earlier that the defence of bona fide purchase is given enhanced scope under the Torrens 
system, thus availing the benefit of indefeasibility to a wider group of registered purchasers. 
For consistency with the fraud exception, which sets a high threshold for defeating a registered 
title, the term ‘good faith’ in section 4(1) has to be broadly interpreted so as to mean absence 
of fraud.117 In other words, a purchaser is to be regarded as having acted in good faith unless 
he or she has committed fraud.118 Since mere notice of an existing trust is not fraud, a purchaser 
having such notice can still be regarded as having acted in good faith, and is therefore donned 
with the armour of indefeasibility. In contrast, under the general law, notice of the trust may 
indicate lack of good faith, thus denying the purchaser of a defence.119  
From these discussions, it is clear that a viable solution to B’s predicament is more than 
just expressly providing for a trust exception. Were it so straightforward, one would expect the 
trust exceptions in South Australia and Singapore to be more widely applied instead of being 
subjected to cautious treatment. The worry is that, in the absence of any straightforward way 
of reconciling the trust exception and the notice provision, a broad interpretation of the former 
wound unduly undermine the principle of indefeasibility. In this regard, the explicit inclusion 
of a volunteer exception by Baalman provided the crucial impetus for extending the trust 
exception to allow a claim against R in the appropriate circumstances. The examination of 
Singapore law also draws attention to the different forms a volunteer exception can take. The 
obvious attraction of Baalman’s variant of the volunteer exception is that it is less intrusive on 
the principle of indefeasibility, allowing even registered volunteers to acquire indefeasible title 
in certain situations. 
 
IX Conclusion 
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The right of a beneficiary to assert his equitable title against the recipient of a misdirected trust 
asset, which is well established in equity, has important and far-reaching implications. In so 
far as the recovery of the trust asset is concerned, the claim succeeds against all recipients 
except where he or she is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the trust. 
Importantly, the right is premised on the strength of the equitable title alone; there is no 
additional requirement that the recipient be shown to be have acted dishonestly or fraudulently. 
Beyond recovery of trust assets, the beneficiary’s right also serves as a springboard for 
claiming compensation or account of profits on the ground of knowing receipt.120  
However, where the trust asset consists of, or becomes invested in, registered land, 
whether such claims could succeed has been put to doubt on the basis that they would 
undermine the indefeasibility of registered title. This article observes that the alleged conflict 
between the beneficiary’s claim and the principle of indefeasibility is often overstated. Recent 
cases which suggest that the beneficiary’s claim would fail all involved registered purchasers 
of misdirected trust assets, who are unquestionably protected by the principle of indefeasibility. 
These cases do not directly address the question of whether the recipient will be equally 
protected if he or she is a registered volunteer. Interestingly, there are older cases where the 
beneficiary was allowed to recover misdirected trust asset from a volunteer recipient, thus 
suggesting that volunteers are not protected in the same way as purchasers are.  
The chief obstacle to reconciling the cases on the basis of the volunteer–purchaser 
distinction is undoubtedly the notice provision, which is commonly understood to forbid the 
beneficiary’s claim absolutely. But this overlooks the relationship between the doctrine of 
notice (which the notice provision seeks to abolish) and the defence of bona fide purchase 
(which can only be invoked by a purchaser). If the purpose of the notice provision is only to 
enhance the bona fide purchase defence, which is irrelevant to a volunteer, then it is easy to 
see why it does not have the effect of preventing the beneficiary from claiming against a 
volunteer. The Torrens legislation in Singapore, which explicitly sets out both trust and 
volunteer exceptions, provides a clear illustration of how the two issues are tied to one another. 
The limitation of this preferred analysis, however, is that it is premised on the recognition of a 
volunteer exception. Although the different Torrens legislations share a common origin, the 
volunteer exception has not received uniform recognition across the different Torrens 
jurisdictions. The divergence is conveniently summarised in the table below: 
 
Jurisdiction Trust exception Volunteer exception 
Australian Capital Territory — — 
New South Wales — No 
Northern Territory — No 
Queensland — No 
South Australia Yes Yes 
Tasmania — — 
Victoria — Yes 
Western Australia — No 
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Singapore Yes Yes 
 
The result of this incoherence is that there is an element of luck in the beneficiary’s 
claim. The success of the claim will depend largely on where the disputed property is located, 
or more specifically, on the applicable Torrens legislation. In failing to pay sufficient attention 
to the divergence between the different Torrens legislations, existing case law and academic 
literature give the misleading impression that there is only one answer to whether a 
beneficiary’s equitable title persists to bind a third-party recipient of misdirected trust asset. 
This would be to fall into the trap of over-generalisation. 
 
 
